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Abstract: Interest is growing in carbon dioxide enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR) as an additional 
economic incentive for CO2 injection and demonstration of storage feasibility. However, given 
increasing societal concern over fossil fuel energy, could CO2-EOR unintentionally hinder 
conventional CCS by reducing support from neutral or cautiously supportive voices? This paper 
assesses how stakeholders and citizens respond to four scenarios for CCS with CO2-EOR in the North 
Sea, and draws societal implications for deployment in other mature basins. Based on focus group data 
from Aberdeen, Edinburgh and London, we argue that scenarios emphasising maximising oil recovery 
may be met with scepticism or even opposition, and that there is an expectation for national 
governments to lead and ensure CO2-EOR (and CCS more generally) are undertaken in the public 
interest. Nonetheless, our data also suggests a certain degree of pragmatism as to the embeddedness of 
fossil fuels in society, and thus that there may be qualified support for CCS with CO2-EOR as making 
best use of existing fields whilst decarbonising the power and industrial sectors. However, for this 
support to emerge there is an imperative for coherent and credible policy that positions CO2-EOR 
firmly within a managed transition towards a low-carbon economy. 
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Research highlights: 
 
• Empirical study into stakeholder and public perceptions of CO2-EOR; 
• Scenarios for CO2-EOR in North Sea with CCS trialed with focus groups; 
• Limited support for CO2-EOR with maximising recovery focus; 
• Qualified support for CO2-EOR as part of managed low-carbon transition; 
• Shows importance of credible and coherent energy and climate policies. 
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1. Introduction and background 1 
 2 
The slower-than-anticipated progress of full-scale integrated carbon dioxide capture and storage 3 
(CCS) projects in recent years has opened up debates on whether carbon dioxide-enhanced oil 4 
recovery (hereafter CO2-EOR) can help pave the way for CO2 storage by giving an additional 5 
economic incentive for CO2 injection and also demonstrating the technical feasibility of long-term 6 
CO2 storage (e.g. Kemp and Kasim, 2013). However, of increasing importance given the recent 7 
prominence of the perceived deleterious effects of fossil fuels within debates on the future of national 8 
energy mixes (Corry and Riesch, 2012) is the role of public and stakeholder perception in influencing 9 
how CO2-EOR in the context of CCS is viewed by policymakers. Whilst there is the potential for CO2-10 
EOR to stimulate CCS, could it therefore also be the case that CO2-EOR may unintentionally hinder 11 
CCS by tipping the ‘reluctant acceptance’ or ‘neutral’ stance publics and key stakeholders may hold 12 
for conventional CCS (Littlecott, 2012; Mabon et al, 2014) towards scepticism or even opposition? 13 
 14 
We assess this issue through data collected from focus groups undertaken in the United Kingdom 15 
between spring and autumn 2014, during which potential scenarios for deployment of CO2-EOR in the 16 
North Sea were trialled with participants in order to gain feedback and stimulate discussion. At the 17 
time of the research the UK government CCS Commercialisation competition was under 18 
consideration, with both candidates (Peterhead in north-east Scotland and White Rose in Yorkshire) 19 
intending to utilise sub-seabed storage in the North Sea. With the UK CCS Commercialisation 20 
competition subsequently being withdrawn in autumn 2015, CO2-EOR may theoretically at least be an 21 
alternative source of funding for moving towards storage deployment, and in any case remains an 22 
option elsewhere in the world. Price volatility has also brought into focus the future of oil and gas 23 
production and associated employment in the North Sea, with Scottish Green Party co-convener 24 
Patrick Harvie provoking debate in January 2016 by advocating a ‘managed decline’ of North Sea oil 25 
and gas extraction in tandem with a transition to a more sustainable employment base for north-east 26 
Scotland (Scottish Green Party, 2016). The findings of our data therefore have continued relevance to 27 
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both the future of the North Sea with respect to oil production versus climate change imperatives, and 28 
to CO2-EOR with CCS beyond the immediate deployment of power sector CCS in the UK. 29 
 30 
After reviewing literature on governance of CO2-EOR and outlining our research method, we discuss 31 
three key questions arising from participants’ responses: what is the purpose of CO2-EOR; who 32 
benefits; and is CO2-EOR appropriate in the sense of being technically or economically viable. We 33 
identify challenges and opportunities for policymakers arising from these participant questions, 34 
arguing that there may in cases be a certain degree of pragmatism among more environmentally-35 
leaning stakeholders and citizens as to the realities of the role of fossil fuels in the energy system. We 36 
suggest CO2-EOR has potential to appeal to a wide range of constituencies as a means of extracting 37 
remaining required oil in a more sensitive manner, but at the same time caution that governments must 38 
create conditions for credible scenarios for CO2-EOR, situated firmly in the context of a managed 39 
transition for the North Sea and oil- and gas-producing regions like it, if CO2-EOR is to garner societal 40 
support in this way. 41 
 42 
2. Literature survey 43 
 44 
Research into public and stakeholder perceptions of CCS is now well-established (see Ashworth et al, 45 
2015), hence in the interest of brevity we focus on work into public and stakeholder views on CCS in 46 
the context of CO2-EOR. Much thinking in this area concerns the potential of CO2-EOR to make CCS 47 
more attractive to both stakeholders (for instance policymakers, investors and developers) and publics 48 
by giving additional economic incentives. In a comparison of policy stakeholders across four US 49 
states, Chaudhry et al (2013) found greater (albeit not universal) support for CCS in Texas – largely 50 
due to the possibility of using captured CO2 for EOR in the state’s oil fields. Research with 51 
stakeholders in Saudi Arabia (Liu et al, 2012) and China (Reiner and Liang, 2012) has likewise found 52 
there tends to be more enthusiasm for CCS when it is linked with the possibility of CO2-EOR to boost 53 
yields from existing nearby oil fields. For publics too, Hovorka and Tinker (2010) believe CO2-EOR 54 
offers advantages over sequestration in brine formations due to the potential for royalties, fees for 55 
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surface access and potential for jobs in host communities. In practice, Sacuta and Anderson (2014) 56 
note positive discussions around the Weyburn CO2-EOR project, Boyd (2015) linking this to the role 57 
of the operators as major employers in the community. 58 
 59 
Boyd (2015) also, however, sees trust in developers and local pride in technological innovation as 60 
factors informing support in Weyburn. It may hence also be the case that existing understanding of the 61 
organisations and technologies associated with subsurface operations in specific locations suitable for 62 
CO2-EOR offers a starting point towards more general societal support for CO2 storage. Both Melzer 63 
(2012) and Sacuta et al (2013) indicate positive experiences with CO2-EOR on specific projects 64 
arising from public familiarity with oil infrastructure and processes may lead to broader social 65 
acceptance of CO2 storage, Nunez-Lopez et al (2008) and Hovorka and Tinker (2010) both suggesting 66 
the value of CO2-EOR in demonstrating the ability in practice to trap hydrocarbons over periods of 67 
geological time. 68 
 69 
Nonetheless, CO2-EOR is not universally portrayed as a bridge towards full CCS. Sacuta and 70 
Anderson (2014) stress the need to distinguish between CCS and CO2-EOR in public engagement, 71 
Setiawan and Cuppen (2013) arguing in the context of Indonesia that stakeholders do not see a clear 72 
connection between CCS and EOR, instead associating CCS with centralised coal-burning power 73 
plants. Stakeholders or publics without so much exposure to oil extraction thus may not so readily see 74 
value in utilising captured CO2 for oil recovery. Even where there is familiarity with oil operations, the 75 
links between CO2 and EOR may not be viewed favourably – Melzer (2012: 12) warns incentivising 76 
operators to undertake CO2-EOR may “be met with cries of corporate welfare given to an industry 77 
already burdened with image problems”, Mabon and Shackley (2015) noting Scottish environmental 78 
stakeholders expressed concern that EOR utilising CO2 captured from CCS processes may shift CCS 79 
from being a ‘bridge’ to renewables to a means of perpetuating a fossil fuel economy. 80 
 81 
At the very least, positive experience in one location should not be taken to mean CO2-EOR in the 82 
context of CCS will be supported more widely. Klokk et al (2010) indicate the possibility for 83 
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heterogeneity in stakeholder perceptions of CO2 utilisation in Norway by suggesting the distribution of 84 
value and risk among value chain stakeholders ought to be researched further. Boyd (2015) warns of 85 
over-generalising from her Weyburn findings, noting perceived benefits and risks may differ 86 
depending on local contexts. 87 
 88 
In sum, research to date into public and stakeholder perceptions of CCS in the context of CO2-EOR 89 
suggests a more favourable stance towards CCS might be expected among both communities and 90 
stakeholders spatially proximate to existing oil extraction infrastructure, where there could be 91 
perceived economic and job benefits, and that familiarity with oil and gas processes in such locations 92 
could offer a pathway to wider societal support for CO2 storage. Equally, though, the link between 93 
CO2-EOR and CCS may not be clearly understood and a range of societal perspectives on CO2-EOR 94 
can exist – including possible hostility towards ‘prolonging’ fossil fuel extraction. This research builds 95 
on these findings by considering how CO2-EOR may be perceived in a mature oil-producing region 96 
that enjoys significant income and employment benefits, yet also one where there is also good 97 
understanding of and civic pride in alternative renewable energy sources (Warren and McFadyen, 98 
2010) and awareness of climate issues. 99 
 100 
3. Method 101 
 102 
Seven discussion groups were convened between spring and autumn 2014 in several locations across 103 
the UK. The aim was to encapsulate a range of familiarity with/proximity to potential North Sea CO2-104 
EOR sites and associated infrastructure, and to capture a range of public and stakeholder perspectives. 105 
Three discussion groups were carried out in Aberdeen (one with members of the public, one with 106 
stakeholders with an interest in the marine environment, one with early career oil and gas 107 
professionals studying at a local university) due to its close proximity to current oil and gas production 108 
and a basin geologically suitable for sub-seabed CO2 storage and/or CO2-EOR; two in Edinburgh (one 109 
with members of the public, one with academics and other professionals with an interest in 110 
environmental issues but not working on CCS directly) due to its greater distance from oil production 111 
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and high visibility of environmental issues as a result of the city being the seat of the Scottish 112 
Parliament; and two in London (one with representatives of the financial sector, particularly ‘green 113 
investment’, and one with environmental NGOs) – whilst London is outwith Scotland, the clustering 114 
of ‘green investment’ stakeholders and NGOs made it a relevant site, particularly given the ability of 115 
national-level NGOs to shape public opinion (Littlecott, 2012). 116 
 117 
Each group lasted two hours. After a short introductory presentation on climate change, the need for 118 
decarbonisation and the possible role of CCS, a 5-10 minute facilitated discussion solicited 119 
participants’ initial thoughts on CCS as a whole system and energy/climate change more broadly. 120 
Participants then received a presentation on EOR (noting in particular that CO2-EOR is just one form 121 
of EOR), with a slightly longer (10-15 minute) facilitated discussion to get initial reactions to CO2-122 
EOR. The researchers then presented four scenarios for CO2-EOR in the North Sea (see below), before 123 
progressing to the main (30-40 minute) facilitated discussion on CO2-EOR. As a conclusion to each 124 
session, participants were asked (a) which of the four scenarios they wanted to happen; and (b) which 125 
of the four they thought was most likely to happen. Research team members undertook all presentation 126 
and facilitation. 127 
 128 
Each session was audio-recorded and transcribed, with transcripts anonymised to remove reference to 129 
particular individuals and (where appropriate) organisations. Through a review of relevant literature 130 
into public and stakeholder perceptions of CO2-EOR, key themes driving perception of CO2-EOR 131 
were identified (see Section 2 above). The transcripts of the focus groups were re-read, seeking to 132 
identify places where themes raised in previous research were either confirmed or challenged. 133 
Particular attention was paid to any new themes arising that may not have been identified in earlier 134 
studies. The data was thus analysed in an iterative way, reading first to identify relevant themes, and 135 
then refining these themes and concepts accordingly in light of their relation to findings from other 136 
studies. To increase the validity of conclusions drawn, the researchers read the transcripts 137 
independently of one another and then compared their findings afterwards. Additionally, the 138 
perceptions of each group on CO2-EOR were plotted onto a matrix according to how strongly they 139 
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identified with the four scenarios presented (see Section 4.1) and what they saw as the barriers and 140 
enablers to CO2-EOR (see Section 5). 141 
 142 
Given continuing low public awareness of CCS (Ashworth et al, 2015) let alone CO2-EOR, to 143 
stimulate discussion four different ‘scenarios’ were constructed for the future of the North Sea. These 144 
focused on (a) the extent to which CO2 storage was deployed; and (b) the extent of climate ambition. 145 
These were loosely aligned with the economic scenarios developed by Durusut et al (2013): 146 
 147 
1. Maximise recovery, limited climate focus – this was also termed the ‘Wood Review’ scenario 148 
for ease of participant identification. This scenario would aim to maximise oil recovery, 149 
injecting only enough CO2 to recover as much oil as is potentially viable; 150 
 151 
2. Maximise recovery, maximise climate focus – this was termed the ‘CO2-EOR’ scenario. 152 
Under this scenario, oil would be recovered to a high degree, but large quantities of CO2 153 
would also be injected as part of climate change mitigation; 154 
 155 
3. Limited recovery, maximise climate focus – this was termed the ‘low carbon’ scenario. This 156 
scenario would see limited CO2 injection for CO2-EOR purposes, but a high drive for 157 
decarbonisation, with a focus on offshore renewable development and CO2 storage in the 158 
North Sea; 159 
 160 
4. Limited recovery, limited climate focus – this was termed the ‘decline’ scenario. This scenario 161 
would see a decline in oil production in the North Sea, with nothing replacing it. 162 
 163 
These scenarios were selected as they provided polarised positions for both climate focus and recovery 164 
ambitions, thus giving participants a sense of the markedly different contexts into which CO2-EOR 165 
could be deployed. It was made clear from the outset that these scenarios were only ‘caricatures’, 166 
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developed to provoke discussion within the groups on possible trajectories for the North Sea. 167 
Participants were encouraged to challenge the scenario framings and/or to suggest alternative 168 
conceptualisations of their own. The details within each of these scenarios were deliberately kept to a 169 
minimum during presentation, in order to encourage the participants themselves to consider the 170 
conditions that could lead to the emergence of such a scenario, and to think about the context (if any) 171 
in which such a scenario could be desirable. We now evaluate participants’ responses to these 172 
scenarios, offer suggestions for how stakeholders and publics feel CO2-EOR in the North Sea ought to 173 
be governed, and reflect on what the implications of this are for the governance of CCS more 174 
generally. 175 
 176 
4. Results 177 
 178 
4.1. Response to scenarios 179 
 180 
We first provide a general overview of how the groups responded to the specific scenarios presented to 181 
them. As mentioned in Section 3, at the end of the session participants were asked which scenario they 182 
wanted to happen, and which they thought was most likely to happen. Figure 1 provides an overview 183 
of the general consensus within each group as to where their opinions lay on desired versus expected 184 
scenarios, showing also the difference between preference and expectation. Whilst there was no major 185 
debate or disagreement in this regard within any of the groups by the end of the sessions, it should be 186 
noted that these positions are a composite assessment of multiple views expressed in each focus group 187 
discussion and therefore not necessarily reflective of individual participant views or nuanced 188 
differences of opinion that may have occurred between participants within groups. Such differences 189 
are picked up on in the qualitative analysis of discussion transcripts following in Section 4.2. 190 
 191 
Figure 1: desired and expected outcomes of CO2-EOR scenarios from focus groups (adapted from 192 
Mabon and Littlecott, 2015) 193 
 194 
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 195 
 196 
The first thing to note is that all groups tended to see scenarios with higher climate ambition as more 197 
desirable (i.e. ‘CO2-EOR focus’ and ‘low-carbon focus’). Participants believed it was important for 198 
policy to reflect a need to mitigate climate change via a transition to a low-carbon economy. This was 199 
true even when stakeholders simultaneously were positive about the potential development of CO2-200 
EOR. In part this can be explained by the fact the highest levels of CO2-EOR deployment are 201 
associated with action on climate change, given that this is the basis on which (in the UK at least) 202 
significant volumes of CO2 would be provided via onshore power or industrial CCS projects. 203 
However, within the groups there was near-universal acceptance of the need for climate action, and for 204 
North Sea objectives to be coherent with such climate mitigation. The strong preference for scenarios 205 
with a high climate ambition provides an opportunity for policy makers to appeal to the aspirations of 206 
multiple stakeholders. Framings that place CO2-EOR within a wider view of North Sea transition into 207 
the future are likely to be more favourably received. Conversely, approaches that only seek to 208 
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maximise North Sea recovery goals without attention to climate goals are likely to be viewed 209 
negatively, and may even in cases be a trigger for opposition to CO2-EOR. 210 
 211 
The second response to the scenarios was the clear gap between desired and expected outcomes across 212 
all stakeholder groups. This notably includes a retreat from climate change aspirations back towards 213 
what were perceived to be ‘business as usual’ objectives on fossil fuel extraction – aligned with the 214 
‘Wood Review’ scenario. As well as reflecting participants’ concerns over the effects on climate 215 
change mitigation efforts if CO2-EOR was framed purely in terms of maximising recovery, this also 216 
hints at lack of confidence in and scepticism of governments’ ability to drive long-term change over 217 
periods transcending electoral cycles. This was particularly true for stakeholders most closely linked to 218 
the pursuit of current objectives on oil and gas production. For instance, participants in the Aberdeen 219 
offshore stakeholders focus group strongly underlined the challenge of technical credibility of any 220 
proposed policy framework, given the lag-times and inertia of private sector investment cycles in 221 
North Sea assets. Their view was therefore that ‘decline’ was the most likely outcome rather than 222 
increased investment in either oil production or broader North Sea transition activities (including CO2-223 
EOR). 224 
 225 
The combined impact of these two trends (desire for future-orientated objectives, but gap between 226 
desired and expected outcomes) suggests governing the deployment of CO2-EOR in the context of 227 
CCS is a challenging area for policy makers where aspirations are difficult to deliver in reality. 228 
However, the broad support for scenarios with high climate goals does provide an opportunity for 229 
policy makers to develop longer-term and coherent objectives in association with diverse stakeholders 230 
as a means of addressing multiple concerns. We now turn to the participants’ own responses to the 231 
scenarios to develop the above points and consider in more depth the conditions under which – if any 232 
– CO2-EOR could be viewed as an acceptable and viable part of Scotland’s energy transition. 233 
 234 
4.2. Participants’ own responses 235 
 236 
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As per Section 3, the scenarios presented to participants were intended to provoke discussion – of 237 
equal if not greater interest than establishing which of the four prescribed scenarios the groups 238 
favoured the most were the responses they raised themselves. The transcripts were analysed in relation 239 
to the themes emerging from extant literature into CO2-EOR, and it transpired that the themes outlined 240 
in Section 2 did also emerge in our UK-specific data, namely: (a) CO2-EOR as a means of bringing 241 
economic benefit and employment to communities reliant on oil extraction; (b) CO2-EOR as a 242 
potential pathway to wider CO2 storage; and (c) the possibility for CO2-EOR not to be perceived as 243 
part of CCS and/or climate change mitigation. The responses from the UK focus group participants 244 
added extra nuance to these themes, however, raising additional questions around the wider context of 245 
CO2-EOR deployment. Rather than automatically seeing CO2-EOR as a pathway to CO2 storage, 246 
participants questioned what the actual purpose of CO2-EOR is. Likewise, rather than assuming CO2-247 
EOR would bring economic benefit to communities reliant on and familiar with oil infrastructure, 248 
questions arose over who would actually benefit from CO2-EOR. And more than challenging the links 249 
between CO2-EOR and CCS, some participants questioned the moral propriety of prolonging fossil 250 
fuel extraction whilst others questioned its very economic and technical viability. We thus consider 251 
these three overarching themes – what the purpose of CO2-EOR is, who benefits, and whether it is 252 
appropriate in terms of being worthwhile or viable – in turn. 253 
 254 
4.2.1. What is the purpose of CO2-EOR? 255 
 256 
Nearly all participants – stakeholders and publics – agreed human-induced climate change was 257 
occurring, and that changes to energy production and consumption were required to reduce climate 258 
risks. Within this, there was also good general agreement that CCS and associated CO2-EOR could in 259 
principle be considered part of the suite of low-carbon energy sources that may be drawn on to 260 
mitigate climate change: 261 
 262 
On a case to case basis per if you start to work out barrel costs, it doesn’t make any sense to do CCS 263 
but if you then take a step back and look at the fact that the climate is changing and is going to have a 264 
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negative impact on a variety of things, including our economics, if you look at that scale surely we 265 
need to make these technologies as part of a portfolio of successful things, something to aspire to 266 
perhaps (marine biologist, Aberdeen offshore stakeholders, M) 267 
 268 
[CO2-EOR with CCS] will give you, you kind of, giving yourself more time to buy something else, 269 
another sort of energy source basically cause the way I have understood it is that if you are able to get 270 
more oil what seems to be over CO2, into the atmosphere, then you are able to delay the climate 271 
change process, giving you time for the technology to develop which over time is a cleaner energy 272 
source (citizen, Aberdeen public, M) 273 
 274 
There was less agreement on how CO2-EOR and CCS would be deployed in practice, with discussion 275 
over whether carbon dioxide storage was indeed part of a move to a decarbonised energy system, or 276 
whether it gave means to uncritically perpetuate a fossil fuel-based economy. Some participants 277 
particularly worried about reliance on 'technical fixes' and short-term economic gain without wider 278 
reflection on societal governance and organisation or longer-term climate and energy issues: 279 
 280 
[CO2-EOR] has to be in that context of significant global leadership and sort of a shift towards a true 281 
transition rather than a just a technical fix in terms of CO2 emissions (sustainability consultant, 282 
Edinburgh climate professionals, M) 283 
 284 
If it’s driven by climate and it’s driven by a vision that says hey, this is going to make it more socially 285 
and politically acceptable to use these things as part of a transition, and there is a real defined 286 
transition (researcher, London NGOs, F) 287 
 288 
Nonetheless, there was also recognition of the embeddedness of fossil fuels within contemporary 289 
society, both in terms of reliance on oil and also on coal- and gas-fired power stations for electricity (it 290 
is interesting to note that only limited mention was made of CO2 emissions from industrial sources 291 
such as steel and cement works, and when these were discussed they were raised by stakeholders with 292 
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significant energy and environmental knowledge). Under this more pragmatic stance – which was also 293 
adopted by some stakeholders more cautious or critical of fossil fuels – CO2-EOR combined with CCS 294 
was perceived as a means of decarbonising remaining thermal power plants, whilst also extracting 295 
remaining required oil in a more sensitive manner: 296 
 297 
We think as part of the UK’s climate targets for 2030, there is still room for some gas by 2030 and if 298 
you can capture some of the carbon from that good. If you can link that with industrial process 299 
emissions as well to capture some of that, we’re supportive (economist, London NGOs, M) 300 
 301 
Well I think, just trying to be pragmatic about it, ideally we probably wouldn’t be using fossil fuels, we 302 
all agree that if we had that option, but we’re clearly going to. Governments are not going to give up 303 
and we all live lives that are dependent on it, so I guess the question in that context of where does one 304 
aim for the most sensible outcome, putting aside any sort of aspirations of going back five thousand 305 
years in time and having a different life (finance stakeholder, London finance stakeholders, M) 306 
 307 
As well as being part of a transition to a low-carbon energy system, there was also some (albeit 308 
limited) discussion of the role of CO2-EOR in a transition to more socially sustainable ways of living. 309 
What is meant by this is giving a less sudden and more realistic trajectory away from employment in 310 
fossil fuel-based industries, especially in locations like Aberdeen where the local economy is heavily 311 
dependent on oil and gas industries. 'Social sustainability' in this sense also means a more gentle 312 
transition away from fossil fuels, with CO2-EOR giving extra time to address issues such as 313 
intermittency and potentially high consumer bills perceived as being associated with a rapid transition 314 
to renewables: 315 
 316 
I imagine this is part of a, you know, progressive policy to address fuel poverty and you know, bring a 317 
whole load of stuff together  as part of that transition, and you say so [names operator] is making a lot 318 
of money but you know someone has got to operate the rig, that’s, that’s fine. If it is seen as being 319 
government bending over backwards, if it’s seen to be allowing their friends in oil to make even more 320 
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money at the expense of people in Easterhouse, who can’t afford to pay for anything, but that is a 321 
completely different situation so it is about the reality and the perception of that reality is crucial to 322 
this in terms of public acceptability, in my view (sustainability consultant, Edinburgh climate 323 
professionals, M) 324 
 325 
This theme of what the purpose of CO2-EOR in the context of CCS is – and in particular what 326 
advantages it may offer to society – leads into the second theme identified as driving perceptions. 327 
Namely, who benefits from CO2-EOR? 328 
 329 
4.2.2. Who benefits from CO2-EOR? 330 
 331 
Similar to findings into research on 'conventional' CCS (e.g. Mabon and Shackley, 2015), publics in 332 
particular expressed concerns over CO2-EOR being used not for climate change mitigation, but for 333 
operators to continue generating large profits without reflection on the potential environmental and 334 
social effects of their practices: 335 
 336 
I think you would have to find something really, really positive to offset that we are not subsidising oil 337 
companies per se but we are subsidising their research to help climate change or to extract more oil 338 
etcetera (citizen, Edinburgh public, F) 339 
 340 
So okay this is [names operator], this the [names operator] that is literally pulling out of Aberdeen, 341 
four rigs offshore or something and they’ve set aside their money, for their putting down on, this is a 342 
company that, will we make a couple of bucks here as we are leaving sort of thing, the oil and gas 343 
thing, isn’t it? (citizen, Edinburgh public, M) 344 
 345 
At a rather more abstract level, questions were also raised over who ought to be allowed to benefit 346 
from EOR. Participants suggested that if CO2-EOR were to be perceived as ‘acceptable’, those 347 
benefitting ought to be those from less economically developed nations, developers of other kinds of 348 
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low-carbon energy (in particular renewables), or communities that relied on oil and gas industries for 349 
employment and may be at risk were these industries to close down or decline rapidly: 350 
 351 
An interesting question that comes up is should we be investing in CCS in other countries where they 352 
actually have moral permission to use fossil [fuel] for longer? Maybe that’s the way we approach 353 
CCS because if we do it in the UK we know that it will have tighter regulations to make it more 354 
challenging (youth activist, London NGOs, F) 355 
 356 
I was just wondering if that could be done in the North Sea but that value reinvested in other sources 357 
of our energy, wind turbines, tidal wave energy and so on, I think that is it important to have a 358 
balance of where our energy is coming from, and alternative sources as well (citizen, Edinburgh 359 
public, M) 360 
 361 
I think you have also got to remember that the oil companies are in many cases rightly portrayed as 362 
pariahs but they make an awful lot of money that pays an awful lot of people’s pensions, because they 363 
are shareholders and the main shareholders are pension companies, financial and the likes, it is not 364 
just Russia, or somebody sitting at the top counting all the cash that is made and you have to make 365 
sure that these companies remain profitable eh so you don’t want to cut them off completely because 366 
so many people rely directly on them (citizen, Aberdeen public, M) 367 
 368 
The key idea here is that CO2-EOR ought to benefit society as a whole, rather than the profits of 369 
private developers. Within this, there is also a sense that CO2-EOR and CCS should be used for 370 
purposes viewed as morally ‘good’, such as allowing less economically advantaged nations to develop 371 
economically; generating funds for research, development and deployment of renewable energy 372 
sources; and aiding communities heavily dependent on oil and gas industries for employment. 373 
Suggestions made as to how this ‘ethical’ use of CO2-EOR could be facilitated included ring-fencing a 374 
share of the tax revenue generated through continuation of oil extraction, or the establishment of a 375 
national CO2 storage company to oversee developments: 376 
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 377 
We thought for [the CO2-EOR focus] to be done we would offer incentives, maybe a tax break or 378 
something like that. And we also thought that there would be more, there would be more tax because 379 
there’s more oil, so we would set aside a portion of that to invest in the low-carbon focus, that was our 380 
long-term plan (student, Aberdeen young professionals, F) 381 
 382 
Going back to the public body thing, I guess the remit for that public body makes a massive difference, 383 
because they could just sort of be in the pocket of the oil and gas industry versus a public body with a 384 
really robust remit and a priority to tackle climate change versus one who’s not. In that situation it 385 
seems preferable to just being led by industry (youth activist, London NGOs, F) 386 
 387 
Underneath these discussions on the 'right' purpose of CO2-EOR in the context of CCS was an even 388 
bigger question on whether society even ought to be spending time and resources pursuing such 389 
developments. This issue of the appropriateness of CO2-EOR formed a third cluster of discussion. 390 
 391 
4.2.3. Is CO2-EOR appropriate in terms of being viable and/or worthwhile? 392 
 393 
What ‘appropriateness’ meant in the context of participants’ responses concerned (a) if CO2-EOR was 394 
technically, economically and politically viable; and (b) whether CO2-EOR was ultimately worthwhile 395 
in terms of the positive effects it offered. This acknowledgment of the finite nature of fossil fuels, 396 
limited global progress on CCS and the perceived inevitable need to switch to renewable energy 397 
sources led some participants to question whether CO2-EOR and indeed CCS as a whole system were 398 
even worth pursuing: 399 
 400 
How much of a difference is that going to make globally if nobody else is doing anything else, if you 401 
are only storing the CO2 in these fields there and the rest globally, the rest are going to say you know 402 
what we are not going to bother with this, would that make any difference to the climate then? Just 403 
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this wee pocket in the North Sea, storing you know the carbon storage and using it for enhance oil 404 
(citizen, Aberdeen public, F) 405 
 406 
How much gas, how much oil is there left there, from what we’ve got at the moment? […] This 407 
government, the governments are very good at doing knee-jerk reactions like five years in front or ten 408 
years but we should be thinking about twenty or thirty or fifty years in front, where we are going with 409 
the thing before they start putting money into projects (Edinburgh public, M) 410 
 411 
Opinions on the finite nature of fossil fuels tended to come from members of the public or less 412 
technically engaged stakeholders. By contrast, in the more specialised focus groups (especially 413 
offshore stakeholders and carbon finance professionals), concerns were raised over the viability of 414 
CO2-EOR in relation to current political, economic and technical regimes: 415 
 416 
CO2-EOR still doesn’t make economic sense because I can guarantee you that if it did make economic 417 
sense oil companies would already be doing it (energy analyst, Aberdeen offshore stakeholders, M) 418 
 419 
I think on that point part of the problem is that the oil companies won’t touch this, because it’s just 420 
magma, you couldn’t build a strategy round it at the moment (finance stakeholder, London finance, F) 421 
 422 
90% of the platforms offshore won’t be suitable […] viable with regards to what you might want to do 423 
it may be viable to do it, the small congested platforms and if you gotta put a whole new whole bridge 424 
next to it [laughter] it becomes even less economically viable (oil and gas engineer, Aberdeen offshore 425 
stakeholders, M) 426 
 427 
By contrast, just as there was acknowledgment of the declining timeframe for continued use of fossil 428 
fuels in the context of acting on climate change and also the potentially large political and fiscal 429 
challenges required, there was also acknowledgment of the need for some continued fossil fuel use and 430 
the challenges of decarbonising industrial sources of CO2-EOR emissions. Building on the above 431 
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points about CO2-EOR forming part of a managed transition away from fossil fuels, it was also the 432 
case that ongoing oil extraction – and also other CO2-intensive processes – were sometimes not seen 433 
as viable unless linked to CO2 injection: 434 
 435 
It depends what you’re comparing it to. Comparing CCS to renewables is different to comparing CCS 436 
to a power plant with no CCS on it…one of the things I do think about CCS is that it is a good idea for 437 
industrial applications for chemicals and cement and paper and all that list of things (energy advisor, 438 
London NGOs, F) 439 
 440 
When a company is applying for licences you can tie that to the licence and encourage companies to 441 
explore CCS technologies. In the end they are not losing, because they can use this carbon dioxide to 442 
pull out more oil. So the government gains and industry also gains, because they are getting to 443 
improve climate change, and industry is also going to get more oil out of the ground (employee of 444 
west African operator, Aberdeen young professionals, M) 445 
 446 
Whilst many participants did not necessarily see CCS and CO2-EOR as being viable in and of 447 
themselves, it was nevertheless suggested that CO2-EOR injection had a pivotal role to play in 448 
bridging the tension between continuing oil recovery and climate change mitigation. Indeed, the fact 449 
that CO2-EOR was only one type of EOR (and the only one with immediate climate benefits via CO2 450 
storage) was new information to many participants, including a number of the environmentally-451 
focused stakeholders. A policy challenge that arose out of this was to find ways to encourage – or even 452 
mandate – CO2 injection as part of ongoing extraction operations. Key to note as well is the perception 453 
that national governments are seen as having a responsibility to create the conditions in which CCS 454 
and CO2-EOR become viable for industry, and to ensure such developments are governed in the public 455 
interest. The implications of our findings for the governance of CO2-EOR in the context of CCS form 456 
the final section of our paper. 457 
 458 
5. Discussion - implications for governance of CO2-EOR 459 
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 460 
Any consideration of CO2-EOR by policy makers will need to include an assessment of how it will be 461 
perceived by stakeholders, and whether this provides opportunities for policy options – or indeed risks 462 
that should be managed in advance. As a foundation for any such consideration, we present here an 463 
overview of key themes identified across focus groups, with particular emphasis on what the broader 464 
implications from this North Sea study may be for CO2-EOR – and indeed CCS – more widely. 465 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the main barriers and enablers to CO2-EOR identified across the focus group 466 
discussions, giving an indication of the extent to which these arguments arose in each group. 467 
 468 
Figure 2: groups’ perceived barriers to support for CO2-EOR deployment (adapted from Mabon and 469 
Littlecott, 2015) 470 
 471 
 472 
Figure 3: policy initiatives perceived by groups as engendering support for CO2-EOR deployment 473 
(adapted from Mabon and Littlecott, 2015) 474 
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 475 
 476 
5.1. Barriers and challenges for CO2-EOR deployment 477 
 478 
One key barrier to CO2-EOR deployment coming across strongly from the data was concern over 479 
technical and economic viability. Some stakeholders and publics did speak positively about CO2-EOR 480 
prolonging the life of the North Sea whilst helping towards climate goals through associated CCS. 481 
This included not only those directly involved in oil and gas, but also others (such as fishers and 482 
shipping operators) who enjoyed mutually beneficial and economically positive relationships with oil 483 
and gas operators, and saw CO2-EOR as a way of sustaining these relationships whilst meeting climate 484 
challenges. Nonetheless, whereas previous studies tended to show higher support for CO2-EOR among 485 
stakeholders with experience of the oil and gas industries, in this study those with greater experience 486 
and knowledge of offshore operations were among the more sceptical of the likelihood of CO2-EOR 487 
linked to CCS occurring in the North Sea. This stemmed from such participants’ concerns over the 488 
technical suitability of existing North Sea infrastructure for CO2 injection, and scepticism over 489 
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whether CO2-EOR would ever be viable in the North Sea given the complexities and perceived 490 
investment risks involved. The fact these concerns come from stakeholders closer to the policy, 491 
economics and practice of CO2-EOR serves as a reminder that scenarios for CO2-EOR and CCS seen 492 
as socially desirable must be tempered with a recognition of what is viable given complex market and 493 
political realities. 494 
 495 
Secondly, stakeholders with a more environmental focus tended to emphasise the links between EOR, 496 
CCS and what they viewed as the deleterious effects of a fossil-fuel based economy. At a general 497 
level, these stakeholders saw a risk that the usage of captured CO2 for EOR could lead to ‘mission 498 
drift’, shifting from a bridging technology for a low-carbon energy future to a means of allowing 499 
continued extraction of oil without reflection from end-point users on the implications of perpetuating 500 
dependence on fossil fuels. The ‘low-carbon energy future’ such participants ultimately envisioned 501 
involved not only renewable energy sources, but also reduction in energy demand through behaviour 502 
change at the personal level and re-consideration of how society is governed more widely. This is in 503 
line with comments from Scottish non-governmental organisations which saw CO2-EOR as a ‘bad 504 
price to pay for a good thing’ (Mabon and Littlecott, 2015), with a preference for other forms of CO2 505 
storage. 506 
 507 
Thirdly, a topic of discussion across all focus groups was the perceived clash between short term 508 
decision making (linked in particular to electoral cycles) and the need for longer term planning for 509 
infrastructure deployment and the delivery of a credible North Sea transition plan. This reinforces the 510 
above finding about scepticism over the efficacy of policy interventions and the gap between desired 511 
and expected outcomes across all stakeholder constituencies – something that the UK government 512 
decision in autumn 2015 to withdraw support for the UK CCS Commercialisation competition will 513 
have done little to redress. 514 
 515 
If CO2-EOR is to garner public and stakeholder support, there is thus the need for policymakers to 516 
envision scenarios that positions CO2-EOR within long-term, integrated thinking on the governance of 517 
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climate change and renewal of energy systems, in a way that perhaps transcends short-term political 518 
cycles. It is worth noting the expectation among participants that governments would lead on creating 519 
the conditions for CO2-EOR to facilitate this transition, ideas such as the formation of a national CO2 520 
storage company or the creation of fiscal regimes being raised by participants themselves. Doubts over 521 
whether global oil, gas and coal markets would support the capture and storage of low-cost CO2, even 522 
in the face of some existing climate change policies, further reinforces the need for policy that 523 
instigates CO2 storage and shows coherence between energy provision and climate change obligations. 524 
 525 
5.2. Opportunities for CO2-EOR deployment 526 
 527 
Concerns about the negative connotations of a fossil fuel-driven energy system reported in previous 528 
research were repeated – especially among more environmentally-focused stakeholders and citizens. 529 
However, our data illustrates there may nonetheless be cautious and qualified support for some CO2-530 
EOR if framed strictly in terms of producing and utilising remaining fossil fuel resources in a more 531 
controlled and sensitive manner (e.g. maximising use of existing domestic fields rather than further 532 
exploration in new and/or potentially sensitive environments), and regulated and governed in such a 533 
way as to be embedded within a transition to renewable energy sources and more sustainable forms of 534 
energy use and behaviour.  535 
 536 
Our dataset also revealed a certain degree of pragmatism as regards the UK’s current energy 537 
(electricity, heat and fuel) situation. Even among more cautious stakeholders such as environmental 538 
professionals and some citizens, there was a pragmatic recognition – which perhaps does not come 539 
across so explicitly in previous studies – that some oil would continue to be required during the 540 
transition to a low-carbon economy, and that CCS offered a means of decarbonising existing gas- and 541 
coal-fired power stations (and heat provision and industrial sources) during the transition. Publics too 542 
– including those in Aberdeen who may have been expected to strongly focus on the economic and 543 
employment prospects of CO2-EOR – widely acknowledged the need for climate change mitigation 544 
and the move towards renewable sources of energy as part of this. Yet set against this in our data was 545 
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scepticism towards both the technical and economic viability of CO2-EOR, and also the ability of 546 
policymakers and developers to deliver in the context of climate change mitigation. Alongside the goal 547 
of maximising economic return of oil reserves, therefore, for support for CO2-EOR to emerge it ought 548 
to be the case that more than ‘demonstrating’ storage capability, there is from the outset a clear climate 549 
imperative for undertaking CO2-EOR as part of CCS. Related to this but only raised peripherally in 550 
our dataset – perhaps as a result of the focus on North Sea transitions – is also the role CO2-EOR could 551 
play in building capability and driving down costs for the capture and transport stages of the CCS 552 
chain, for instance by giving incentives for CO2 sources to capture and/or connecting up EOR 553 
operators with a source of CO2. 554 
 555 
Returning to the points made in Section 5.1., crucial to the emergence of support for CO2-EOR as part 556 
of CCS is the public interest case – benefitting society at large through climate change mitigation, job 557 
creation/retention and manageable energy costs. Key here is that regardless of whether or not oil and 558 
gas companies would significantly profit financially from CO2-EOR in the North Sea or elsewhere, if 559 
operators come to be perceived as the primary beneficiaries of CO2-EOR then support may be limited. 560 
This data thus suggests a role for governments in overseeing (or even directly delivering) CO2-EOR 561 
and associated CO2 storage plus CCS capacity building is crucial in building positive perception. 562 
Increasing volatility in oil prices and subsequent effects on North Sea jobs since the completion of the 563 
empirical research in this study – coupled with intensifying concerns over energy security and fossil 564 
fuel imports – could serve to further reinforce support for CO2-EOR as part of a just transition for the 565 
North Sea, squaring climate change obligations with support for domestic oil production and its 566 
associated jobs. 567 
 568 
This parallels Mabon and Shackley’s (2015) exploration of CCS as potentially the ‘lesser of two evils’ 569 
– that is, citizens and stakeholders may view the pursuit of CO2-EOR in relation to CCS in a way that 570 
is ‘less bad’ than the alternatives outlined above. There is thus an opportunity for policymakers to 571 
frame CO2-EOR as making the most efficient use of existing domestic oil fields whilst simultaneously 572 
reducing atmospheric CO2 emissions from electricity generation and industrial sources. To retain 573 
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credibility this must however be couched in a wider framework of transition and a clear pathway for 574 
how CO2-EOR will help to accelerate a move towards low-carbon technologies. 575 
 576 
5.3. Limitations and directions for future research 577 
 578 
It is important to acknowledge some of the limitations of our research technique and framework. 579 
Given the limited time available to discuss CO2-EOR in the context of CCS with participants, it was 580 
necessary to take a focused approach to the discussion – in this case, we elected to follow scenarios for 581 
the future of the North Sea. Participants’ views on the North Sea and CO2 storage may however be 582 
influenced by a much wider range of political, social and economic forces that cannot be explored 583 
fully within the bounds of a two-hour discussion. Methodologically, there is also a tension between the 584 
flexibility of a qualitative approach and the inevitable subjectivity this introduces – particularly 585 
because as per normal ethical procedures for social research (protection of participant anonymity and 586 
confidentiality) the ‘raw data’ of the transcripts themselves cannot be included with the paper. 587 
Processes such as assessing inter-coder reliability (Viera and Garrett, 2005) or more quantitative 588 
analysis techniques for social data like emotional textual analysis (Vercelli et al, 2014) may offer more 589 
systematic analysis for subsequent research, following on from broader-based studies like ours that 590 
allow the key themes and ideas to be identified. Nonetheless, we believe the broad range of themes 591 
raised by participants – from specific policy and finance matters to social justice through to ethical and 592 
moral contestations – justifies a research design that allows participants to raise issues they themselves 593 
deem to be of importance and understand the issue at hand on their own terms. This is especially true 594 
when awareness of the more technical aspects of CCS may be low (see Malone et al, 2010) and hence 595 
it may be important not to ‘close down’ discussion or pre-empt what participants consider significant. 596 
 597 
Further research may wish to explore further what the end goal is of the ‘managed transition’ many 598 
participants spoke about. Issues that may be assessed here include the kinds of low-carbon energy 599 
technology that could be involved and the time frames/costs associated with their deployment, how 600 
changes to governance and individual behaviours may be enacted in practice, and how CO2-EOR may 601 
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facilitate this transition through contribution to physical infrastructure or financial returns to the 602 
government and/or private sector. There may also be value in going beyond this study’s focus on 603 
storage to assess the contribution CO2-EOR could make to the capture and transport parts of the CCS 604 
chain, particularly given the emerging interest in industrial emissions and the withdrawal of UK 605 
government support for full-scale power sector CCS. Such work could enlist further engagement with 606 
environmental NGOs and professionals, and also experts in energy analysis and energy systems. 607 
 608 
It may also be worthwhile considering the difference between other parts of the world – where there is 609 
familiarity with CO2-EOR and a ready source of CO2 – and Scotland. Of particular interest in this 610 
regard is the fact that development of CO2-EOR in, say, North America was initially an economic 611 
decision, whereas in Scotland the motivation is more likely to be climate change mitigation. It may 612 
thus be of value to explore how publics and stakeholders’ perceptions of CO2-EOR relate to their 613 
perceptions of coal/gas or industrial CCS, and to consider the extent to which policy and engagement 614 
lessons from CO2-EOR in other parts of the world are transferrable to Scotland. Conversely, the 615 
difference in perception between onshore CO2-EOR in North America and the mixed picture reported 616 
here for offshore CO2-EOR in Scotland is a reminder that public and stakeholder reception may vary 617 
dramatically depending on socio-cultural background, which should be factored into any application 618 
of these results onwards to a non-Scottish/UK/EU context. 619 
 620 
6. Conclusions 621 
 622 
Whilst the context upon which the empirical data on which this paper is based – the potential for 623 
offshore CCS deployment in the UK – has changed with the withdrawal of UK CCS competition 624 
funding, our findings still hold relevance for the future of the North Sea, CO2-EOR and CCS more 625 
generally. Within the UK, the need to decarbonise industrial sources remains, and CO2-EOR may be 626 
one way of helping to fill the finance gap. Further afield, CO2-EOR projects also continue to emerge 627 
globally, hence there is a need for understanding the societal implications of such deployments. The 628 
responses presented here suggest that if CO2-EOR is to be deployed in the context of CCS, policy 629 
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makers will need to consider a broad canvas of policy options and public interest framings. It is 630 
important to repeat that a noticeably negative response was observed for a narrow ‘Wood Review’-631 
type focus on using CO2-EOR solely as a means of maximising economic recovery of oil and gas. 632 
Instead, broader narratives of transition and future vision for a mature basin like the North Sea in the 633 
context of a need for action on climate change had greater appeal and were seen to provide a framing 634 
within which the scale of (public) investment in CO2-EOR could be economically and socially 635 
justifiable. Further, the scepticism across stakeholder groups as to the deliverability of desired 636 
outcomes underlines the need for policy solutions to be technically robust as well as attractive to a 637 
range of stakeholders, and in many cases the expectation was that governments would lead on creating 638 
the contexts for this to emerge. This need for CO2-EOR to be framed within broader narratives of 639 
decarbonisation and a managed transition away from fossil fuel if it is to garner societal acceptance is 640 
a key finding from the North Sea research, and one that ought to be further evaluated through similar 641 
enquiry elsewhere. 642 
 643 
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